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O P I N I O N  
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 The issue presented before the en banc court is 
whether SB 2460, which the New Jersey Legislature enacted 
in 2014 to partially repeal certain prohibitions on sports 
gambling (the “2014 Law”), violates federal law.  2014 N.J. 
Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 62, codified at N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 5:12A-
7 to -9.  The District Court held that the 2014 Law violates 
the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act 
(“PASPA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3704.  A panel of this Court 
affirmed this ruling in a divided opinion which was 
subsequently vacated upon the grant of the Petition for 
Rehearing en banc.  We now hold that the District Court 
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correctly ruled that because PASPA, by its terms, prohibits 
states from authorizing by law sports gambling, and because 
the 2014 Law does exactly that, the 2014 Law violates federal 
law.  We also hold that we correctly ruled in Christie I that 
PASPA does not commandeer the states in a way that runs 
afoul of the Constitution.  
I. Background 
 Congress passed PASPA in 1992 to prohibit state-
sanctioned sports gambling.  PASPA provides: 
 
It shall be unlawful for— 
 
 (1) a governmental entity to 
sponsor, operate, advertise, 
 promote, license, or authorize by 
law or compact, or 
 
 (2) a person to sponsor, operate, 
advertise, or promote,  pursuant to 
the law or compact of a governmental 
entity,a lottery, sweepstakes, or other 
betting, gambling, or wagering scheme 
based . . . on one or more competitive 
games in which amateur or professional 
athletes participate, or are intended to 
participate, or on one or more 
performances of such athletes in such 
games. 
 
28 U.S.C. § 3702 (emphasis added).  PASPA defines 
“governmental entity” to include states and their political 
subdivisions.  Id. § 3701(2).  It includes a remedial provision 
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that permits any sports league whose games are or will be the 
subject of sports gambling to bring an action to enjoin the 
gambling.  Id. § 3703.    
 
 Congress included in PASPA exceptions for state-
sponsored sports wagering in Nevada and sports lotteries in 
Oregon and Delaware, and also an exception for New Jersey 
but only if New Jersey were to enact a sports gambling 
scheme within one year of PASPA’s enactment.  Id. 
§ 3704(a).  New Jersey did not do so, and thus the PASPA 
exception expired.  Notably, sports gambling was prohibited 
in New Jersey for many years by statute and by the New 
Jersey Constitution.  See, e.g., N.J. Const. Art. IV § VII ¶ 2; 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:37-2; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:40-1.  In 
2010, however, the New Jersey Legislature held public 
hearings on the advisability of allowing sports gambling.  
These hearings included testimony that sports gambling 
would generate revenues for New Jersey’s struggling casinos 
and racetracks.  In 2011, the Legislature held a referendum 
asking New Jersey voters whether sports gambling should be 
permitted, and sixty-four percent voted in favor of amending 
the New Jersey Constitution to permit sports gambling.  The 
constitutional amendment provided:  
 
It shall also be lawful for the Legislature 
to authorize by law wagering at casinos 
or gambling houses in Atlantic City on 
the results of any professional, college, 
or amateur sport or athletic event, except 
that wagering shall not be permitted on a 
college sport or athletic event that takes 
place in New Jersey or on a sport or 
athletic event in which any New Jersey 
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college team participates regardless of 
where the event takes place . . . . 
 
N.J. Const. Art. IV, § VII, ¶ 2(D).  The amendment thus 
permitted the New Jersey Legislature to “authorize by law” 
sports “wagering at casinos or gambling houses in Atlantic 
City,” except that wagering was not permitted on New Jersey 
college teams or on any collegiate event occurring in New 
Jersey.  An additional section of the amendment permitted the 
Legislature to “authorize by law” sports “wagering at current 
or former running and harness horse racetracks,” subject to 
the same restrictions regarding New Jersey college teams and 
collegiate events occurring in New Jersey.  Id. ¶ 2(F).    
 
 After voters approved the sports-wagering 
constitutional amendment, the New Jersey Legislature 
enacted the Sports Wagering Act in 2012 (“2012 Law”), 
which provided for regulated sports wagering at New Jersey’s 
casinos and racetracks.  N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 5:12A-1 et seq. 
(2012).  The 2012 Law established a comprehensive 
regulatory scheme, requiring licenses for operators and 
individual employees, extensive documentation, minimum 
cash reserves, and Division of Gaming Enforcement access to 
security and surveillance systems.   
 
 Five sports leagues1 sued to enjoin the 2012 Law as 
violative of PASPA.2  The New Jersey Parties did not dispute 
                                              
 1 The sports leagues were the National Collegiate 
Athletic Association, National Football League, National 
Basketball Association, National Hockey League, and the 
Office of the Commissioner of Baseball, doing business as 
Major League Baseball (collectively, the “Leagues”). 
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that the 2012 Law violated PASPA, but urged instead that 
PASPA was unconstitutional under the anti-commandeering 
doctrine.  The District Court held that PASPA was 
constitutional and enjoined implementation of the 2012 Law.  
The New Jersey Parties appealed, and we affirmed in 
National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New 
Jersey, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013) (Christie I).   
 
 In Christie I, we rejected the New Jersey Parties’ 
argument that PASPA was unconstitutional by 
commandeering New Jersey’s legislative process.  In doing 
so, we stated that “[n]othing in [PASPA’s] words requires 
that the states keep any law in place.  All that is prohibited is 
                                                                                                     
 2 The Leagues named as defendants Christopher J. 
Christie, the Governor of the State of New Jersey; David L. 
Rebuck, the Director of the New Jersey Division of Gaming 
Enforcement and Assistant Attorney General of the State of 
New Jersey; and Frank Zanzuccki, Executive Director of the 
New Jersey Racing Commission.  The New Jersey 
Thoroughbred Horsemen’s Association, Inc. (“NJTHA”) 
intervened as a defendant, as did Stephen M. Sweeney, 
President of the New Jersey Senate, and Sheila Y. Oliver, 
Speaker of the New Jersey General Assembly (“State 
Legislators”).  We collectively refer to these parties as the 
“New Jersey Parties.”  In the present case, the New Jersey 
Parties are the same, with some exceptions.  NJTHA was 
named as a defendant (i.e., it did not intervene), as was the 
New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority; the latter is not 
participating in this appeal.  Additionally, Vincent Prieto, not 




the issuance of gambling ‘license[s]’ or the affirmative 
‘authoriz[ation] by law’ of gambling schemes.”  Id. at 232 
(alterations in original).  The New Jersey Parties had urged 
that PASPA commandeered the state because it prohibited the 
repeal of New Jersey’s prohibitions on sports gambling; they 
reasoned that repealing a statute barring an activity would be 
equivalent to authorizing the activity, and “authorizing” was 
not allowed by PASPA.  We rejected that argument, 
observing that “PASPA speaks only of ‘authorizing by law’ a 
sports gambling scheme,” and “[w]e [did] not see how having 
no law in place governing sports wagering is the same as 
authorizing it by law.”  Id. (emphasis in original).  We further 
emphasized that “the lack of an affirmative prohibition of an 
activity does not mean it is affirmatively authorized by law.  
The right to do that which is not prohibited derives not from 
the authority of the state but from the inherent rights of the 
people.”  Id. (emphasis in original).  In short, we concluded 
that the New Jersey Parties’ argument rested on a “false 
equivalence between repeal and authorization.”  Id. at 233.  
The New Jersey Parties appealed to the Supreme Court of the 
United States, which denied certiorari.   
 
 Undeterred, in 2014, the Legislature passed the 2014 
Law, SB 2460, which provided in part: 
 
[A]ny rules and regulations that may 
require or authorize any State agency to 
license, authorize, permit or otherwise 
take action to allow any person to engage 
in the placement or acceptance of any 
wager on any professional, collegiate, or 
amateur sport contest or athletic event, or 
that prohibit participation in or operation 
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of a pool that accepts such wagers, are 
repealed to the extent they apply or may 
be construed to apply at a casino or 
gambling house operating in this State in 
Atlantic City or a running or harness 
horse racetrack in this State, to the 
placement and acceptance of wagers on 
professional, collegiate, or amateur sport 
contests or athletic events . . . . 
 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:12A-7.  The 2014 Law specifically 
prohibited wagering on New Jersey college teams’ 
competitions and on any collegiate competition occurring in 
New Jersey, and it limited sports wagering to “persons 21 
years of age or older situated at such location[s],” namely 
casinos and racetracks.  Id.  
II. Procedural History and Parties’ Arguments 
 The Leagues filed suit to enjoin the New Jersey Parties 
from giving effect to the 2014 Law.  The District Court held 
that the 2014 Law violates PASPA, granted summary 
judgment in favor of the Leagues, and issued a permanent 
injunction against the Governor of New Jersey, the Director 
of the New Jersey Division of Gaming Enforcement, and the 
Executive Director of the New Jersey Racing Commission 
(collectively, the “New Jersey Enjoined Parties”).3  The 
                                              
 3 In the District Court, the New Jersey Enjoined Parties 
urged that the Eleventh Amendment gave them immunity 
such that they could not be sued in an action challenging the 
2014 Law.  The District Court rejected this argument, as do 
we, and we note that, while the issue was briefed, the New 
Jersey Enjoined Parties did not press—or even mention—this 
13 
 
                                                                                                     
issue at oral argument before either the merits panel or the en 
banc court.  They contend that, because the 2014 Law is a 
self-executing repeal that requires no action from them or any 
other state official, they are immune from suit.  This 
argument fails.  The New Jersey Enjoined Parties are subject 
to suit under the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh 
Amendment immunity, which “permit[s] the federal courts to 
vindicate federal rights and hold state officials responsible to 
‘the supreme authority of the United States.’”  Pennhurst 
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984) 
(quoting Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 160 (1908)).  The 
contrary argument of the New Jersey Enjoined Parties relies 
on a false premise that execution of the 2014 Law involves no 
affirmative ultra vires act by state officials.  But the 2014 
Law is far from passive.  As we conclude at length, the 2014 
Law establishes a regulatory regime that authorizes wagering 
on sports in limited locations for particular persons, so it is an 
affirmative act by New Jersey state officials to authorize by 
law sports betting, in violation of PASPA.  As such, 
implementation of the law falls squarely within the Ex parte 
Young exception to sovereign immunity because it is “simply 
an illegal act upon the part of a state official in attempting, by 
the use of the name of the state, to enforce a legislative 
enactment which is void because” it is contrary to federal law.  
209 U.S. at 159.  “In determining whether the doctrine of Ex 
parte Young avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit, a 
court need only conduct a straightforward inquiry into 
whether the complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal 
law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.”  
Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Maryland, 
535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (internal quotation marks and 
alterations omitted).  That is precisely the situation we face in 
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District Court interpreted Christie I as holding that PASPA 
offers two choices to states: maintaining prohibitions on 
sports gambling or completely repealing them.  It reasoned 
that the 2014 Law runs afoul of PASPA because the 2014 
Law is a partial repeal that necessarily results in sports 
wagering with the State’s imprimatur.  The New Jersey 
Parties appealed.   
 
 On appeal, the New Jersey Parties argue that the 2014 
Law does not constitute an authorization in violation of 
PASPA and it is consistent with Christie I because the New 
Jersey Legislature effected a repealer as Christie I specifically 
permitted.   
 
 The Leagues urge that the 2014 Law violates PASPA 
because it “authorizes by law” sports wagering and also 
impermissibly “licenses” the activity by confining the repeal 
of gambling prohibitions to licensed gambling facilities and 
thus, in effect, enlarging the terms of existing gaming 
licenses.  The United States submitted an amicus brief in 
support of the Leagues. 
 
 A panel of this Court affirmed in a divided opinion, 
which was subsequently vacated.  Because we, sitting en 
banc, essentially agree with the reasoning of the panel 
majority’s opinion, we incorporate much of it verbatim in this 
opinion.  
                                                                                                     
this case.  We therefore need not address the unsettled 
question of whether an Ex parte Young exception must exist 
in the case of a truly self-executing law because the 2014 Law 





A. The 2014 Law Violates PASPA 
 As a preliminary matter, we acknowledge the 2014 
Law’s salutary purpose in attempting to legalize sports 
gambling to revive its troubled casino and racetrack 
industries.  The New Jersey Assembly Gaming and Tourism 
Committee chairman stated, in regard to the 2014 Law, that 
“[w]e want to give the racetracks a shot in the arm.  We want 
to help Atlantic City.  We want to do something for the 
gaming business in the state of New Jersey, which has been 
under tremendous duress . . . .”  (App. 91.)  New Jersey State 
Senator Ray Lesniak, a sponsor of the law, has likewise stated 
that “[s]ports betting will be a lifeline to the casinos, putting 
people to work and generating economic activity in a growth 
industry.”  (App. 94.)  And New Jersey State Senator Joseph 
Kyrillos stated that “New Jersey’s continued prohibition on 
sports betting at our casinos and racetracks is contrary to our 
interest of supporting employers that provide tens of 
thousands of jobs and add billions to our state’s economy” 
and that “[s]ports betting will help set New Jersey’s wagering 
facilities apart from the competition and strengthen 
Monmouth Park and our struggling casino industry.”  (App. 
138.)  PASPA has clearly stymied New Jersey’s attempts to 
                                              
 4 “We review a district court’s grant of summary 
judgment de novo . . . .”  Viera v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 642 
F.3d 407, 413 (3d Cir. 2011).  “We review a district court’s 
grant of a permanent injunction for abuse of discretion.”  




revive its casinos and racetracks and provide jobs for its 
workforce.   
 
 Moreover, PASPA is not without its critics, even aside 
from its economic impact.  It has been criticized for 
prohibiting an activity, i.e., sports gambling, that its critics 
view as neither immoral nor dangerous.  It has also been 
criticized for encouraging the spread of illegal sports 
gambling and for making it easier to fix games, since it 
precludes the transparency that accompanies legal activities.  
Simply put, “[w]e are cognizant that certain questions related 
to this case—whether gambling on sporting events is harmful 
to the games’ integrity and whether states should be permitted 
to license and profit from the activity—engender strong 
views.”  Christie I, 730 F.3d at 215.  While PASPA’s 
provisions and its reach are controversial (and, some might 
say, unwise), “we are not asked to judge the wisdom of 
PASPA” and “[i]t is not our place to usurp Congress’ role 
simply because PASPA may have become an unpopular law.”  
Id. at 215, 241.  We echo Christie I in noting that “New 
Jersey and any other state that may wish to legalize gambling 
on sports . . . are not left without redress.  Just as PASPA 
once gave New Jersey preferential treatment in the context of 
gambling on sports, Congress may again choose to do so 
or . . . may choose to undo PASPA altogether.”  Id. at 240-41.  
Unless that happens, however, we are duty-bound to interpret 
the text of the law as Congress wrote it.   
 
 We now turn to the primary question before us: 
whether the 2014 Law violates PASPA.  We hold that it does.  
Under PASPA, it shall be unlawful for “a governmental entity 
to sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize 
by law or compact” sports gambling.  28 U.S.C. § 3702(1).  
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We conclude that the 2014 Law violates PASPA because it 
authorizes by law sports gambling.   
 
 First, the 2014 Law authorizes casinos and racetracks 
to operate sports gambling while other laws prohibit sports 
gambling by all other entities.  Without the 2014 Law, the 
sports gambling prohibitions would apply to casinos and 
racetracks.  Appellants urge that the 2014 Law does not 
provide authority for sports gambling because we previously 
held that “[t]he right to do that which is not prohibited derives 
not from the authority of the state but from the inherent rights 
of the people” and that “[w]e do not see how having no law in 
place governing sports wagering is the same as authorizing it 
by law.”  Christie I, 730 F.3d at 232.  But this is not a 
situation where there are no laws governing sports gambling 
in New Jersey.  Absent the 2014 Law, New Jersey’s myriad 
laws prohibiting sports gambling would apply to the casinos 
and racetracks.  Thus, the 2014 Law provides the 
authorization for conduct that is otherwise clearly and 
completely legally prohibited.   
 
 Second, the 2014 Law authorizes sports gambling by 
selectively dictating where sports gambling may occur, who 
may place bets in such gambling, and which athletic contests 
are permissible subjects for such gambling.  Under the 2014 
Law, New Jersey’s sports gambling prohibitions are 
specifically removed from casinos, gambling houses, and 
horse racetracks as long as the bettors are people age 21 or 
over, and as long as there are no bets on either New Jersey 
college teams or collegiate competitions occurring in New 
Jersey.  The word “authorize” means, inter alia, “[t]o 
empower; to give a right or authority to act,” or “[t]o permit a 
thing to be done in the future.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 133 
18 
 
(6th ed. 1990).5  The 2014 Law allows casinos and racetracks 
and their patrons to engage, under enumerated circumstances, 
in conduct that other businesses and their patrons cannot do.  
That selectiveness constitutes specific permission and 
empowerment.   
 
 Appellants urge that because the 2014 Law is only a 
“repeal” removing prohibitions against sports gambling, it is 
not an “affirmative authorization” under Christie I.  To the 
extent that in Christie I we took the position that a repeal 
cannot constitute an authorization, we now reject that 
reasoning.  Moreover, we do not adopt the District Court’s 
view that the options available to a state are limited to two.  
Neither of these propositions were necessary to their 
respective rulings and were, in essence, dicta.  Furthermore, 
our discussion of partial versus total repeals is similarly 
unnecessary to determining the 2014 Law’s legality because 
the question presented here is straightforward—i.e., what 
does the law do—and does not turn on the way in which the 
state has enacted its directive.  
 
 The presence of the word “repeal” does not prevent us 
from examining what the provision actually does, and the 
Legislature’s use of the term does not change  that the 2014 
Law selectively grants permission to certain entities to engage 
in sports gambling.  New Jersey’s sports gambling 
prohibitions remain, and no one may engage in such conduct 
except those singled out in the 2014 Law.  While artfully 
couched in terms of a repealer, the 2014 Law essentially 
                                              
 5 We cite the version of Black’s Law Dictionary that 
was current in 1992, the year PASPA was passed.   
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provides that, notwithstanding any other prohibition by law, 
casinos and racetracks shall hereafter be permitted to have 
sports gambling.  This is an authorization. 
 
 Third, the exception in PASPA for New Jersey, which 
the State did not take advantage of before the one-year time 
limit expired, is remarkably similar to the 2014 Law.  The 
exception states that PASPA does not apply to “a betting, 
gambling, or wagering scheme . . . conducted exclusively in 
casinos . . . , but only to the extent that . . . any commercial 
casino gaming scheme was in operation . . . throughout the 
10-year period” before PASPA was enacted.  28 U.S.C. 
§ 3704(a)(3)(B).  The exception would have permitted sports 
gambling at New Jersey’s casinos, which is just what the 
2014 Law does.  We can easily infer that, by explicitly 
excepting a scheme of sports gambling in New Jersey’s 
casinos from PASPA’s prohibitions, Congress intended that 
such a scheme would violate PASPA.  If Congress had not 
perceived that sports gambling in New Jersey’s casinos would 
violate PASPA, then it would not have needed to insert the 
New Jersey exception.  In other words, if sports gambling in 
New Jersey’s casinos does not violate PASPA, then PASPA’s 
one-year exception for New Jersey would have been 
superfluous.  We will not read statutory provisions to be 
surplusage.  See Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 133 S. Ct. 
1166, 1178 (2013) (“[T]he canon against surplusage is 
strongest when an interpretation would render superfluous 
another part of the same statutory scheme.”).  In order to 
avoid rendering the New Jersey exception surplusage, we 
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must read the 2014 Law as authorizing a scheme that clearly 
violates PASPA.6    
 
 As support for their argument that the 2014 Law does 
not violate PASPA, Appellants cite the 2014 Law’s 
construction provision, which provides that “[t]he provisions 
of this act . . . are not intended and shall not be construed as 
causing the State to sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, 
license, or authorize by law or compact” sports wagering.  
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:12A-8.  This conveniently mirrors 
PASPA’s language providing that states may not “sponsor, 
operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law or 
compact” sports wagering.  28 U.S.C. § 3702(1).   
 
 The construction provision does not save the 2014 
Law.  States may not use clever drafting or mandatory 
construction provisions to escape the supremacy of federal 
law.  Cf. Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 742 (2009) 
(“[T]he Supremacy Clause cannot be evaded by formalism.”); 
Howlett ex rel. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 382-83 (1990) 
(“[t]he force of the Supremacy Clause is not so weak that it 
can be evaded by mere mention of” a particular word).  In the 
same vein, the New Jersey Legislature cannot use a targeted 
construction provision to limit the reach of PASPA or to 
dictate to a court a construction that would limit that reach.  
                                              
 6 Granted, the 2014 Law applies to horse racetracks as 
well as casinos, while the PASPA exception for New Jersey 
refers only to casinos, but that does not change the 
significance of the New Jersey exception because it refers to 
gambling in places that already allow gambling, and the 
racetracks fall within that rubric. 
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The 2014 Law violates PASPA, and the construction 
provision cannot alter that fact.   
 
 Appellants also draw a comparison between the 2014 
Law and the 2012 Law, which involved a broad regulatory 
scheme, as evidence that the 2014 Law does not violate 
PASPA.  It is true that the 2014 Law does not set forth a 
comprehensive scheme or provide for a state regulatory role, 
as the 2012 Law did.  However, PASPA does not limit its 
reach to active state involvement or extensive regulation of 
sports gambling.  It prohibits a range of state activity, the 
least intrusive of which is “authorization” by law of sports 
gambling. 
 
 We conclude that the 2014 Law violates PASPA 
because it authorizes by law sports gambling.7   
                                              
 7 Because we conclude that the 2014 Law authorizes 
by law sports gambling, we need not address the argument 
made by Appellees and Amicus that the 2014 Law also 
licenses sports gambling by permitting only those entities that 
already have gambling licenses or recently had such licenses 
to conduct sports gambling operations.  We also reject the 
argument of the State Legislators and the NJTHA that, to the 
extent that any aspect of the 2014 Law violates PASPA, we 
should apply the 2014 Law’s severability clause.  Citing the 
broadly-worded severability provision of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
5:12A-9, they argue that the District Court should have saved 
the 2014 Law by severing the most objectionable parts.  For 
example, the NJTHA urges that, “if the Court . . . concludes 
that a state decision to prohibit persons under 21 from making 
sports bets is [an] authorization by law for that activity by 





                                                                                                     
it to the sports gambling operators . . . to impose a reasonable 
age limit.”  NJTHA’s Reply Br. at 23.  It also argues that, “if 
the Court concludes that a state decision to prohibit . . . sports 
betting on some games is [an] authorization by law as to 
betting on all other games, this limitation could be severed,” 
and that “the Court can sever the Law’s provision dealing 
with casinos from its provision dealing with racetracks.”  Id. 
at 24.  Lifting the age limitation, permitting betting on New 
Jersey schools’ games, or limiting the authorization to an 
even narrower category of venues, however, would not alter 
our conclusion that the 2014 Law authorizes by law sports 
betting.  “The standard for determining the severability of an 
unconstitutional provision is well established: Unless it is 
evident that the Legislature would not have enacted those 
provisions which are within its power, independently of that 
which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is 
fully operative as a law.”  Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 
U.S. 678, 684 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Because New Jersey’s legislature, in both the 2012 Law and 
the 2014 Law, was loath to permit sports betting outside of 
gambling establishments, we cannot reasonably say that it 
would have enacted a repeal of its gambling laws without the 
age restriction, without the restriction on gambling on New 
Jersey-based college sports, and without the geographic 
restriction to casinos and racetracks.  We thus need not 





B. PASPA Does Not Impermissibly Commandeer the 
States 
 Appellants expend significant effort in this appeal 
revisiting our conclusion in Christie I that PASPA does not 
unconstitutionally commandeer the states.  They root this 
effort in the District Court’s erroneous conclusion that 
PASPA presents states with a binary choice—either maintain 
a complete prohibition on sports wagering or wholly repeal 
state prohibitions.  In Christie I, we engaged in a lengthy 
discussion to rebut Appellants’ assertion that if we conclude 
that New Jersey’s repeal of its prohibition is not permitted by 
PASPA, then it has unconstitutionally commandeered New 
Jersey.  In so doing, we discussed the Supreme Court’s clear 
case law on commandeering.  Our prior conclusion that 
PASPA does not run afoul of anti-commandeering principles 
remains sound despite Appellants’ attempt to call it into 
question using the 2014 Law as an exemplar.    
 1. Anti-Commandeering Jurisprudence 
 As we noted in Christie I, the Supreme Court’s anti-
commandeering principle rests on the conclusion that 
“Congress ‘lacks the power directly to compel the States to 
require or prohibit’ acts which Congress itself may require or 
prohibit.”  Christie I, 730 F.3d at 227 (quoting New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992)).  In our prior survey 
of the anti-commandeering case law in Christie I, we grouped 
four commandeering cases upholding the federal laws at issue 
into two categories: (1) permissible regulation in a pre-
emptible field, Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. & Reclamation 
Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981), and F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, 
456 U.S. 742 (1982); and (2) prohibitions on state action, 
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South Carolina v. Baker,  485 U.S. 505 (1988) and Reno v. 
Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000).  The Supreme Court has struck 
down federal laws on anti-commandeering grounds in only 
two cases, New York v. United States and Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).  We summarize our prior review 
below. 
 
 First, congressional action in passing laws in 
otherwise pre-emptible fields has withstood attack in cases 
where the states were not compelled to enact laws or 
implement federal statutes or regulatory programs 
themselves.  In Hodel, the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of a law that imposed federal standards for 
coal mining.  The law left states a choice.  A state could 
“assume permanent regulatory authority over . . . surface coal 
mining operations” and “submit a proposed permanent 
program” that “demonstrate[s] that the state legislature has 
enacted laws implementing the environmental protection 
standards . . .  and that the State has the administrative and 
technical ability to enforce the[] standards.”  Hodel, 452 U.S. 
at 271.  However, if a state chose not to assume regulatory 
authority, the federal government would “administer[] the Act 
within that State and continue[] as such unless and until a 
‘state program’ [wa]s approved.”  Id. at 272.  As we 
described in Christie I: 
 
The Supreme Court upheld the provisions, 
noting that they neither compelled the states to 
adopt the federal standards, nor required them 
“to expend any state funds,” nor coerced them 
into “participat[ing] in the federal regulatory 
program in any manner whatsoever.”  [Hodel, 
452 U.S.] at 288.  The Court further concluded 
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that Congress could have chosen to completely 
preempt the field by simply assuming oversight 
of the regulations itself.  Id.  It thus held that the 
Tenth Amendment posed no obstacle to a 
system by which Congress “chose to allow the 
States a regulatory role.”  Id. at 290.  As the 
Court later characterized Hodel, the scheme 
there did not violate the anti-commandeering 
principle because it “merely made compliance 
with federal standards a precondition to 
continued state regulation in an otherwise pre-
empted field.”  Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 
898, 926 (1997). 
Christie I, 730 F.3d at 227–28.  The Supreme Court’s opinion 
in F.E.R.C.  v. Mississippi the following year confirmed its 
view that a law does not unconstitutionally commandeer the 
states when the law does not impose federal requirements on 
the states, but leaves states the choice to decline to implement 
federal standards.  456 U.S. 742, 767–68 (upholding a 
provision that required state utility companies to expend state 
resources to “consider” enacting federal standards, but did not 
require states to enact those standards).  
 
 Second, the Supreme Court has found Congress’s 
prohibition of certain state actions to not constitute 
unconstitutional commandeering.  In South Carolina v. 
Baker, the Court upheld federal laws that prohibited the 
issuance of bearer bonds, which required states to amend 
legislation to be in compliance.  485 U.S. at 511, 514 (1988).  




The Court concluded this result did not run 
afoul [of] the Tenth Amendment because it did 
not seek to control or influence the manner in 
which States regulate private parties but was 
simply an inevitable consequence of regulating 
a state activity.  In subsequent cases, the Court 
explained that the regulation in Baker was 
permissible because it simply subjected a State 
to the same legislation applicable to private 
parties. 
 
Christie I, 730 F.3d at 228 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted).  Later, in Reno v. Condon, the Court 
upheld the constitutionality of a law that prohibited states 
from releasing information gathered by state departments of 
motor vehicles.  The Court ultimately concluded that the law 
at issue “d[id] not require the States in their sovereign 
capacity to regulate their own citizens[,] . . . d[id] not require 
the [State] Legislature[s] to enact any laws or regulations, and 
it d[id] not require state officials to assist in the enforcement 
of federal statutes regulating private individuals.”  Reno, 528 
U.S. at 151 (as altered in Christie I, 730 F.3d at 228).  
 
 As noted above, the Supreme Court has invalidated 
laws on anti-commandeering grounds on only two occasions.  
In New York, the Supreme Court struck down a “take-title” 
provision whereby states were required to take title to 
radioactive waste by a specific date, at the waste generator’s 
request, if they did not adopt a federal program.  As we stated 
in Christie I, the provision “compel[led] the states to either 
enact a regulatory program, or expend resources in taking title 
to the waste.”  Christie I, 730 F.3d at 229.  The Supreme 
Court ultimately concluded in New York that the take-title 
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provision “crossed the line distinguishing encouragement 
from coercion.”  505 U.S. at 175.  Similarly in Printz v. 
United States, the Supreme Court concluded that Congress 
“may neither issue directives requiring the States to address 
particular problems, nor command the States’ officers . . . to 
administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.”  521 
U.S. at 935 (finding a federal law requiring state officers to 
conduct background checks on prospective gun owners to 
commandeer the states in violation of the Tenth Amendment).   
 2. PASPA Does Not Violate Anti-Commandeering 
Principles 
 
 We continue to view PASPA’s prohibition as more 
akin to those laws upheld in Hodel, F.E.R.C., Baker, and 
Reno, and distinguishable from those struck down by the 
Supreme Court in New York and Printz.  Our articulation of 
the way in which PASPA does not violate anti-
commandeering principles warrants refinement, however, 
given the way in which the 2014 Law attempted to skirt 
PASPA and the thrust of Appellants’ arguments in this 
appeal.  
 
 In an attempt to reopen the anti-commandeering 
question we previously decided, Appellants creatively rely on 
certain language that was used in Christie I.  In pressing for a 
declaration that PASPA unconstitutionally commandeered the 
states in Christie I, Appellants characterized PASPA as 
requiring the states to affirmatively keep a prohibition against 
sports wagering on their books, lest they be found to have 
authorized sports gambling by law by repealing the 
prohibition.  In response, we opined that Appellants’ position 
“rest[ed] on a false equivalence between repeal and 
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authorization,” implying that a repeal is not an authorization.  
730 F.3d at 233.  Before us now Appellants urge that “[t]his 
Court held [in Christie I] that PASPA is constitutional 
precisely because it permits States to elect not to prohibit 
sports wagering, even if affirmatively authorizing it would be 
unlawful.”  Appellants’ Br. 22 (emphasis in original).  
Appellants are saying, in effect, “We told you so”—if the 
legislature cannot repeal New Jersey’s prohibition as it 
attempted to do in the 2014 Law, then it is required to 
affirmatively keep the prohibition on the books, and PASPA 
unconstitutionally commandeers the states.  We reject this 
argument.   
 
 That said, we view our discussion in Christie I 
regarding the relationship between a “repeal” and an 
“authorization” to have been too facile.  While we considered 
whether repeal and authorization are interchangeable, our 
decision did not rest on that discussion.  Today, we choose to 
excise that discussion from our prior opinion as unnecessary 
dicta.  To be clear, a state’s decision to selectively remove a 
prohibition on sports wagering in a manner that permissively 
channels wagering activity to particular locations or operators 
is, in essence, “authorization” under PASPA.  However, our 
determination that such a selective repeal of certain 
prohibitions amounts to authorization under PASPA does not 
mean that states are not afforded sufficient room under 
PASPA to craft their own policies. 
 
 Appellants urge that our conclusion in Christie I that 
PASPA does not unconstitutionally commandeer the states 
rested on our view that PASPA allows states to “choos[e] 
among many different potential policies on sports wagering 
that do not include licensing or affirmative authorization by 
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the State.”  Appellants’ Br. 29.  This is correct.  PASPA does 
not command states to take affirmative actions, and it does 
not present a coercive binary choice.  Our reasoning in 
Christie I that PASPA does not commandeer the states 
remains unshaken.  
 
 Appellants characterize the 2014 Law as a lawful 
exercise in the space PASPA affords states to create their own 
policy.  They argue that without options beyond a complete 
repeal or a complete ban on sports wagering, such as the 
partial repeal New Jersey pursued, PASPA runs afoul of anti-
commandeering principles.  This argument sweeps too 
broadly.  That a specific partial repeal which New Jersey 
chose to pursue in its 2014 Law is not valid under PASPA 
does not preclude the possibility that other options may pass 
muster.  The issue of the extent to which a given repeal would 
constitute an authorization, in a vacuum, is not before us, as it 
was not specifically before us in Christie I.  However, as the 
Leagues noted at oral argument before the en banc court, not 
all partial repeals are created equal.  For instance, a state’s 
partial repeal of a sports wagering ban to allow de minimis 
wagers between friends and family would not have nearly the 
type of authorizing effect that we find in the 2014 Law.  We 
need not, however, articulate a line whereby a partial repeal 
of a sports wagering ban amounts to an authorization under 
PASPA, if indeed such a line could be drawn.  It is sufficient 
to conclude that the 2014 Law overstepped it.   
 
 Appellants seize on the District Court’s erroneous 
interpretation of Christie I’s anti-commandeering analysis—
namely, that PASPA presents states with a strict binary 
choice between total repeal and keeping a complete ban on 
their books—to once again urge that if PASPA commands 
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such a choice, then it is comparable to the challenged law in 
New York.  First, unlike the take-title provision included in 
the statute at issue in New York, PASPA’s text does not 
present states with a coercive choice to adopt a federal 
program.  To interpret PASPA to require such a coercive 
choice is to read something into the statute that simply is not 
there.   
 
 Second, PASPA is further distinguishable from the law 
at issue in New York because it does not require states to take 
any action.  In New York, the Supreme Court held that a 
federal law that required states to enact a federal regulatory 
program or take title to radioactive waste at the behest of 
generators “crossed the line distinguishing encouragement 
from coercion.”  505 U.S. at 175.  Unlike the law at issue in 
New York, PASPA includes no coercive direction by the 
federal government.  As we previously concluded in Christie 
I, PASPA does not command states to take any affirmative 
steps: 
 
PASPA does not require or coerce the states to 
lift a finger—they are not required to pass laws, 
to take title to anything, to conduct background 
checks, to expend any funds, or to in any way 
enforce federal law.  They are not even 
required, like the states were in F.E.R.C., to 
expend resources considering federal regulatory 
regimes, let alone to adopt them.  Simply put, 
we discern in PASPA no directives requiring 
the States to address particular problems and no 
commands to the States’ officers to administer 
or enforce a federal regulatory program. 
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730 F.3d at 231 (internal quotation marks and alterations 
omitted) (emphasis in original).  Put simply, PASPA does not 
impose a coercive either-or requirement or affirmative 
command.   
 
 We will not allow Appellants to bootstrap already 
decided questions of PASPA’s constitutionality onto our 
determination that the 2014 Law violates PASPA.  We reject 
the notion that PASPA presents states with a coercive binary 
choice or affirmative command and conclude, as we did in 
Christie I, that it does not unconstitutionally commandeer the 
states.    
IV. Conclusion 
 The 2014 Law violates PASPA because it authorizes 
by law sports gambling.  We continue to find PASPA 
constitutional.  We will affirm. 
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FUENTES joined by RESTREPO, Circuit Judges, dissenting: 
 In November 2011, the question of whether to allow 
sports betting in New Jersey went before the electorate.  By a 
2-1 margin, New Jersey voters passed a referendum to amend 
the New Jersey Constitution to allow the New Jersey 
Legislature to “authorize by law” sports betting.1  
Accordingly, the Legislature enacted the 2012 Sports 
Wagering Act (“2012 Law”).  The Sports Leagues challenged 
this Law, claiming that it violated the Professional and 
Amateur Sports Protection Act’s (“PASPA”) prohibition on 
states “authoriz[ing] by law” sports betting.2  In Christie I, we 
agreed with the Sports Leagues and held that the 2012 Law 
violated and thus was preempted by PASPA.  We explained, 
however, that New Jersey was free to repeal the sports betting 
prohibitions it already had in place.  We rejected the 
argument that a repeal of prohibitions on sports betting was 
equivalent to authorizing by law sports betting.  When the 
matter was brought to the Supreme Court, the Solicitor 
General echoed that same sentiment, stating that, “PASPA 
does not even obligate New Jersey to leave in place the state-
law prohibitions against sports gambling that it had chosen to 
adopt prior to PASPA’s enactment.  To the contrary, New 
Jersey is free to repeal those prohibitions in whole or in 
part.”3   
 
                                              
1 N.J. Const. art. IV, § 7, ¶ 2(D). 
2 See 28 U.S.C. § 3702(1). 
3 Br. for the United States in Opp’n at 11, Christie v. Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, Nos. 13-967, 13-979, and 13-980 
(U.S. May 14, 2014). 
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 So New Jersey did just that.  In 2014, the New Jersey 
Legislature repealed certain sports betting prohibitions at 
casinos and gambling houses in Atlantic City and at horse 
racetracks in the State (“2014 Repeal”).  In addition to 
repealing the 2012 Law in full, the 2014 Repeal stripped New 
Jersey of any involvement in sports betting, regulatory or 
otherwise.  In essence, the 2014 Repeal rendered previous 
prohibitions on sports betting non-existent. 
 
 But the majority today concludes that the New Jersey 
Legislature’s efforts to satisfy its constituents while adhering 
to our decision in Christie I are still in violation of PASPA.  
According to the majority, the “selective” nature of the 2014 
Repeal amounts to “authorizing by law” a sports wagering 
scheme.  That is, because the State retained certain 
restrictions on sports betting, the majority infers the 
authorization by law.  I cannot agree with this interpretation 
of PASPA.   
 
 PASPA restricts the states in six ways – a state cannot 
“sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize by 
law or compact” sports betting.4  The only one of these six 
restrictions that includes “by law” is “authorize.”  None of the 
other restrictions say anything about how the states are 
restricted.  Thus, I believe that Congress gave this restriction 
a special meaning—that a state’s “authoriz[ation] by law” of 
sports betting cannot merely be inferred, but rather requires a 
specific legislative enactment that affirmatively allows the 
people of the state to bet on sports.  Any other interpretation 
would be reading the phrase “by law” out of the statute.   
                                              
4 28 U.S.C. § 3702(1) (emphasis added). 
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 Indeed, we stated exactly this in Christie I—that all 
PASPA prohibits is “the affirmative ‘authoriz[ation] by law’ 
of gambling schemes.”5  Thus, we explained, nothing 
prevented New Jersey from repealing its sports betting 
prohibitions, since, “in reality, the lack of an affirmative 
prohibition of an activity does not mean it is affirmatively 
authorized by law.”6  As we noted, “that the Legislature 
needed to enact the [2012 Law] itself belies any contention 
that the mere repeal of New Jersey’s ban on sports gambling 
was sufficient to ‘authorize [it] by law.’”7  The Legislature 
itself “saw a meaningful distinction between repealing the 
ban on sports wagering and authorizing it by law, 
undermining any contention that the amendment alone was 
sufficient to affirmatively authorize sports wagering—the 
[2012 Law] was required.”8  In short, we explained that there 
was a false equivalence between repeal and authorization. 
 
 With the 2014 Repeal, the New Jersey Legislature did 
what it thought it was permitted to do under our reading of 
PASPA in Christie I.  The majority, however, maintains that 
the 2014 Repeal “authorizes” sports wagering at casinos, 
gambling houses, and horse racetracks simply because other 
sports betting prohibitions remain in place.9  According to the 
                                              
5 Christie I, 730 F.3d at 232 (alteration in original). 
6 Id. 
7 Id. (alteration in original). 
8 Id. 
9 I refer to the repeal of prohibitions as applying to casinos, 
gambling houses, and horse racetracks, with the 
understanding that the repeal applies to casinos and gambling 
houses in Atlantic City and horse racetracks in New Jersey 
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majority, “[a]bsent the 2014 Law, New Jersey’s myriad laws 
prohibiting sports gambling would apply to the casinos and 
racetracks,” and thus “the 2014 Law provides the 
authorization for conduct that is otherwise clearly and 
completely legally prohibited.”10  But I believe the majority is 
mistaken as to the impact of a partial repeal. 
 
 A repeal is defined as an “abrogation of an existing 
law by legislative act.”11  When a statute is repealed, “the 
repealed statute, in regard to its operative effect, is considered 
as if it had never existed.”12  If a repealed statute is treated as 
if it never existed, a partially repealed statute is treated as if 
the repealed sections never existed.13  The 2014 Repeal, then, 
simply returns New Jersey to the state it was in before it first 
                                                                                                     
for those over 21 not betting on New Jersey collegiate teams 
or any collegiate competition occurring in New Jersey. 
10 Maj. Op. 17. 
11 Black’s Law Dictionary 1325 (8th ed. 2007). 
12 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 264. 
13 See, e.g., Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514 (1868) 
(“[W]hen an act of the legislature is repealed, it must be 
considered . . . as if it never existed.”); Anderson v. USAir, 
Inc., 818 F.2d 49, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“Common sense 
dictates that repeal means a deletion.  This court would 
engage in pure speculation were it to hold otherwise.”); Kemp 
by Wright v. State, Cty. of Burlington, 687 A.2d 715, 723 
(N.J. 1997) (“In this State it is the general rule that where a 
statute is repealed and there is no saving[s] clause or a general 
statute limiting the effect of the repeal, the repealed statute, in 
regard to its operative effect, is considered as though it had 




enacted those prohibitions on sports gambling.  In other 
words, after the repeal, it is as if New Jersey never prohibited 
sports wagering at casinos, gambling houses, and horse 
racetracks.  Therefore, with respect to those locations, there 
are no laws governing sports wagering.  Contrary to the 
majority’s position, the permission to engage in such an 
activity is not affirmatively granted by virtue of it being 
prohibited elsewhere. 
 
 To bolster its position, the majority rejects our 
reasoning in Christie I, stating that “[t]o the extent that in 
Christie I we took the position that a repeal cannot constitute 
an authorization, we now reject that reasoning.”14  I continue 
to maintain, however, that the 2014 Repeal is not an 
affirmative authorization by law.  It is merely a repeal – it 
does not, and cannot, authorize by law anything. 
 
 In my view, the majority’s position that the 2014 
Repeal “selectively grants permission to certain entities to 
engage in sports gambling”15 is simply incorrect.  There is no 
explicit grant of permission in the 2014 Repeal for any person 
or entity to engage in sports gambling.  Rather, the 2014 
Repeal is a self-executing deregulatory measure that repeals 
existing prohibitions and regulations for sports betting and 
requires the State to abdicate any control or involvement in 
sports betting.16  The majority fails to explain why a partial 
                                              
14 Maj. Op. 18. 
15 Id. 
16 For example, under the 2014 Repeal, “[the Division of 
Gaming Enforcement (“DGE”)] now considers sports 
wagering to be ‘non-gambling activity’ . . . that is beyond 
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repeal is equivalent to a grant of permission (by law) to 
engage in sports betting.   
 
 Suppose the State did exactly what the majority 
suggests it could have done: repeal completely its sports 
betting prohibitions.  In that circumstance, sports betting 
could occur anywhere in the State and there would be no 
restrictions as to age, location, or whether a bettor could 
wager on games involving local teams.  Would the State 
violate PASPA if it later enacted limited restrictions 
regarding age requirements and places where wagering could 
occur?  Surely no conceivable reading of PASPA would 
preclude a state from restricting sports wagering in this 
scenario.  Yet the 2014 Repeal comes to the same result. 
 
 The majority also fails to illustrate how the 2014 
Repeal results in sports wagering pursuant to state law when 
there is effectively no law in place as to several locations, no 
scheme created, and no state involvement.  A careful 
comparison with the 2012 Law is instructive.  The 2012 Law 
lifted New Jersey’s ban on sports wagering and created a 
licensing scheme for sports wagering pools at casinos and 
racetracks in the State.  This comprehensive regime required 
close State supervision and regulation of those sports 
wagering pools.  For instance, the 2012 Law required any 
entity that wished to operate a “sports pool lounge” to acquire 
a “sports pool license.”  To do so, a prospective operator was 
required to pay a $50,000 application fee, secure Division of 
Gaming Enforcement (“DGE”) approval of all internal 
controls, and ensure that any of its employees who were to be 
                                                                                                     




directly involved in sports wagering obtained individual 
licenses from the DGE and the Casino Control Commission 
(“CCC”).  In addition, the betting regime required entities to, 
among other things, submit extensive documentation to the 
DGE, adopt new “house” rules subject to DGE approval, and 
conform to DGE standards.  This, of course, violated PASPA 
in the most basic way: New Jersey developed an intricate 
scheme that both “authorize[d] by law” and “license[d]” 
sports gambling.  The 2014 Repeal eliminated this entire 
scheme.  Moreover, all state agencies with jurisdiction over 
state casinos and racetracks, such as the DGE and the CCC, 
were stripped of any sports betting oversight. 
 
 The majority likewise falters when it analogizes the 
2014 Repeal to the exception Congress originally offered to 
New Jersey in 1992.  The exception stated that PASPA did 
not apply to “a betting, gambling, or wagering scheme . . . 
conducted exclusively in casinos[,] . . . but only to the extent 
that . . . any commercial casino gaming scheme was in 
operation . . . throughout the 10-year period” before PASPA 
was enacted.17  Setting aside the most obvious distinction 
between the 2014 Repeal and the 1992 exception—that it 
contemplated a scheme that the 2014 Repeal does not 
authorize—the majority misses the mark when it states: “If 
Congress had not perceived that sports gambling in New 
Jersey’s casinos would violate PASPA, then it would not 
have needed to insert the New Jersey exception.”18  Congress 
did not, however, perceive, or intend for, private sports 
wagering in casinos to violate PASPA.  Instead, Congress 
prohibited sports wagering undertaken pursuant to state law.  
                                              
17 28 U.S.C. § 3704(a)(3)(B). 
18 Maj. Op. 19.   
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That the 2014 Repeal might bring about an increase in the 
amount of private, legal sports wagering in New Jersey is of 
no moment, and the majority’s reliance on such a possibility 
is misplaced.  The majority is also wrong in a more 
fundamental way.  The exception Congress offered to New 
Jersey was exactly that: an exception to the ordinary 
prohibitions of PASPA.  That is to say, with this exception, 
New Jersey could have “sponsor[ed], operate[d], advertise[d], 
promote[d], license[d], or authorize[d] by law or compact” 
sports wagering.  Under the 2014 Repeal, of course, New 
Jersey cannot and does not aim to do any of these things. 
 
 Because I do not see how a partial repeal of 
prohibitions is tantamount to authorizing by law a sports 




NCAA v. Governor of the State of New Jersey, et al., Nos. 
14-4546, 14-4568, 14-4659 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge, dissenting.        
While Congress “has the authority under the 
Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, 
it lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or 
prohibit those acts.”  New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 
144, 166 (1992) (emphasis added).  Concluding that the 
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (“PASPA”), 
28 U.S.C. § 3701 et seq., was a congressional command that 
States must prohibit wagering on sporting events because it 
forbids the States from “authoriz[ing] by law” such activity, I 
dissented from the holding in Christie I that PASPA was a 
valid exercise of congressional authority.  National Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey (Christie I), 730 
F.3d 208, 241–51 (3d Cir. 2013) (Vanaskie, J., dissenting).  
My colleagues in the majority in Christie I disagreed with my 
conclusion because they believed that States had the option of 
repealing existing bans on sports betting.  Id. at 232.  In 
upholding PASPA, Christie I rejected New Jersey’s argument 
that a repeal of its ban on sports betting would be viewed as 
effectively “authoriz[ing] by law” this activity.  Christie I 
declared that New Jersey’s “attempt to read into PASPA a 
requirement that the states must affirmatively keep a ban on 
sports gambling in their books rests on a false equivalence 
between repeal and authorization.”  Id. at 233.  I viewed that 
“false equivalence” assertion with considerable skepticism.  
Id. at 247 n. 5 (“[I]t certainly is open to debate whether a 
state’s repeal of a ban on sports gambling would be akin to 
that state’s ‘authorizing’ gambling on sporting events . . . .”).  
My skepticism is validated by today’s majority opinion.  The 
majority dodges the inevitable conclusion that PASPA 
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conscripts the States to prohibit wagering on sports by 
suggesting that some partial repeal of the ban on sports 
gambling would not be tantamount to authorization of 
gambling.   
Implicit in today’s majority opinion and Christie I is 
the premise that Congress lacks the authority to decree that 
States must prohibit sports wagering, and so both majorities 
find some undefined room for States to enact partial repeals 
of existing bans on sports gambling.  While the author of 
Christie I finds that New Jersey’s partial repeal at issue here 
is not the equivalent of authorizing by law wagering on 
sporting events, today’s majority concludes otherwise.  This 
shifting line approach to a State’s exercise of its sovereign 
authority is untenable.  The bedrock principle of federalism 
that Congress may not compel the States to require or prohibit 
certain activities cannot be evaded by the false assertion that 
PASPA affords the States some undefined options when it 
comes to sports wagering.  Because I believe that PASPA was 
intended to compel the States to prohibit wagering on 
sporting events, it cannot survive constitutional scrutiny.  
Accordingly, as I did in Christie I, I dissent. 
I.  
According to the majority, “a state’s decision to 
selectively remove a prohibition on sports wagering in a 
manner that permissively channels wagering activity to 
particular locations or operators is, in essence, ‘authorization’ 
under PASPA.”  Maj. Op., at 28.  The majority also claims “a 
state’s partial repeal of a sports wagering ban to allow de 
minimis wagers between friends and family would not have 
nearly the type of authorizing effect that we find in the 2014 
Law.”  Id. at 29.  Thus, according to the majority, the 2014 
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Law is a partial repeal that is foreclosed by PASPA, but 
“other options may pass muster” because “not all partial 
repeals are created equal.”  Id.    
Noticeably, the majority does not explain why all 
partial repeals are not created equal or explain what 
distinguishes the 2014 Law from those partial repeals that 
pass muster.  To further complicate matters, the majority 
continues to rely on Christie I, which did “not read PASPA to 
prohibit New Jersey from repealing its ban on sports 
wagering” and informed New Jersey that “[n]othing in 
[PASPA’s] words requires that the states keep any law in 
place.”  730 F.3d at 232.       
A.  
Christie I “[r]ecogniz[ed] the importance of the 
affirmative/negative command distinction,” and “agree[d] 
with [New Jersey] that the affirmative act requirement, if not 
properly applied, may permit Congress to ‘accomplish 
exactly what the commandeering doctrine prohibits’ by 
stopping the states from ‘repealing an existing law.’”  730 
F.3d at 232 (quoting Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 646 
(9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., concurring)).  Christie I, 
however, discounted concerns regarding PASPA’s 
affirmative act requirement because Christie I “d[id] not read 
PASPA to prohibit New Jersey from repealing its ban on 
sports wagering.”  Id.  According to Christie I, PASPA is 
constitutional because “[n]othing in [PASPA’s] words 
requires that the states keep any law in place.”  Id.  This 
conclusion formed the premise for the conclusion in Christie I 
that PASPA passed constitutional muster.  
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Remarkably, the majority chooses to “excise that 
discussion from our prior opinion as unnecessary dicta.”  Maj. 
Op., at 28.  This cannot be the case, however, because that 
discussion was the cornerstone of the holding in Christie I.  
See In re McDonald, 205 F.3d 606, 612 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(“Chief Judge Posner has aptly defined dictum as ‘a statement 
in a judicial opinion that could have been deleted without 
seriously impairing the analytical foundations of the 
holding—that, being peripheral, may not have received the 
full and careful consideration of the court that uttered it.’” 
(quoting Sarnoff v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 798 F.2d 1075, 
1084 (7th Cir. 1986))).  
Indeed, to rationalize its conclusion in Christie I, the 
Christie I majority had to expressly reject the notion that 
when a state “choose[s] to repeal an affirmative prohibition of 
sports gambling, that is the same as ‘authorizing’ that activity, 
and therefore PASPA precludes repealing prohibitions on 
gambling just as it bars affirmatively licensing it.”  730 F.3d 
at 232.  This aspect of Christie I was not peripheral to the 
ultimate holding because Christie I specifically “agree[d] 
with [New Jersey] that the affirmative act requirement, if not 
properly applied, may permit Congress to ‘accomplish 
exactly what the commandeering doctrine prohibits’ by 
stopping the states from ‘repealing an existing law.’”  Id. 
(quoting Conant, 309 F.3d at 646 (Kozinski, J., concurring)).  
Thus, to resolve the issue before it, Christie I necessarily had 
to give this issue the “full and careful consideration of the 
court.”  In re McDonald, 205 F.3d at 612 (quoting Sarnoff, 
798 F.2d at 1084).    
In giving the issue its full and careful consideration, 
Christie I explained that the notion that a “repeal” could be 
the same as an “authorization” was “problematic in numerous 
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respects.”  730 F.3d at 232; see also id. (“Most basically, it 
ignores that PASPA speaks only of ‘authorizing by law’ a 
sports gambling scheme.”).  Christie I did “not see how 
having no law in place governing sports wagering is the same 
as authorizing it by law.”  Id.  Christie I recognized a 
distinction between affirmative commands for actions and 
prohibitions, and explained that there was “a false 
equivalence between repeal and authorization.”  Id. at 233.  
Thus, as a matter of statutory construction, and to avoid “a 
series of constitutional problems,” Christie I specifically held 
that if the Court did not distinguish between “repeals” 
(affirmative commands) and “authorizations” (affirmative 
prohibitions), the Court would “read[] the term ‘by law’ out 
of [PASPA].”  Id. at 233.  
  I dissented from that opinion because “any distinction 
between a federal directive that commands states to take 
affirmative action and one that prohibits states from 
exercising their sovereignty is illusory.”  730 F.3d at 245 
(Vanaskie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  The 
decision to base Christie I on a distinction between 
affirmative commands for action and affirmative prohibitions 
was “untenable,” because “affirmative commands to engage 
in certain conduct can be rephrased as a prohibition against 
not engaging in that conduct.”  Id.  As I explained, basing 
Christie I on such an illusory distinction raises constitutional 
concerns because “[a]n interpretation of federalism principles 
that permits congressional negative commands to state 
governments will eviscerate the constitutional lines drawn” 




After Christie I, a state like New Jersey at least had 
the choice to either “repeal its sports wagering ban,” or, “[o]n 
the other hand . . . keep a complete ban on sports gambling.”  
Id. at 233 (majority opinion).  The Christie I majority found 
that this choice was not too coercive because it left “much 
room for the states to make their own policy” and left it to a 
State “to decide how much of a law enforcement priority it 
wants to make of sports gambling, or what the exact contours 
of the prohibition will be.”  Id.   
Today’s majority makes it clear that PASPA does not 
leave a State “much room” at all.  Indeed, it is evident that 
States must leave gambling prohibitions on the books to 
regulate their citizens.  A review of the four Supreme Court 
anti-commandeering cases referenced by the majority is 
illuminating.  
1. 
The first two anti-commandeering cases that the 
majority reviews are Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981), and F.E.R.C. v. 
Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982).  As the majority points out, 
these cases address “permissible regulation in a pre-emptible 
field.”  Maj. Op., at 23.  In analyzing these cases, however, 
the majority overlooks the main rule announced by the 
Supreme Court in situations where there is an exercise of 
legislative authority under the Commerce Clause or where 
Congress preempts an area with federal legislation within its 
legislative power.  In such situations, States have a choice: 
they may either comply with the federal legislation or the 
Federal Government will carry the legislation into effect.   
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This rule was announced in Hodel, where the Supreme 
Court explained that “[i]f a State does not wish to . . . 
compl[y] with the Act and implementing regulations, the full 
regulatory burden will be borne by the Federal Government.”  
452 U.S. at 288 (emphasis added).  The same theme repeated 
itself in F.E.R.C., as the Supreme Court focused on “the 
choice put to the States—that of either abandoning regulation 
of the field altogether or considering the federal standards.”  
456 U.S. at 766 (emphasis added).  In both cases, the 
Supreme Court was clear that there must be some choice for 
the states to make because without it “the accountability of 
both state and federal officials is diminished.”  New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992).   
Indeed, in New York v. United States, the Court 
explained that a State’s view on legislation “can always be 
pre-empted under the Supremacy Clause if it is contrary to 
the national view, but in such a case . . . it will be federal 
officials that suffer the consequences if the decision turns out 
to be detrimental or unpopular.”  Id. at 168.  The Supreme 
Court reiterated this point Printz v. United States, explaining 
that, “[b]y forcing state governments to absorb the financial 
burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, 
Members of Congress can take credit for ‘solving’ problems 
without having to ask their constituents to pay for the 
solutions with higher federal taxes.”  521 U.S. 898, 930 
(1997).  Thus, States must be given a choice because the 
Supreme Court is concerned that “it may be state officials 
who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the 
federal officials who devised the regulatory program may 
remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their 
decision.”  New York, 505 U.S. at 169.   
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As the majority explains, while “PASPA’s provisions 
and its reach are controversial (and, some might say, unwise) 
. . . . we are duty-bound to interpret the text of the law as 
Congress wrote it.”  Maj. Op., at 16.  Because the majority 
has excised the distinction between a repeal and an 
authorization, the majority makes it clear that under PASPA 
as written, no repeal of any kind will evade the command that 
no State “shall . . . authorize by law” sports gambling.  28 
U.S.C. § 3702.  In the face of such a congressional directive, 
“no case-by-case weighing of the burdens or benefits is 
necessary; such commands are fundamentally incompatible 
with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty.”  Printz, 
521 U.S. at 935.  
2. 
This leads to the other two anti-commandeering cases 
reviewed by the majority: South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 
505 (1988), and Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000).  The 
majority explains that these cases address permissible 
“prohibitions on state action.”  Maj. Op., at 23.  Again, 
however, the majority seems to overlook the animating factor 
for each of these opinions.  In both Baker and Reno the 
Supreme Court explained that permissible prohibitions 
regulated State activities.  The Supreme Court has never 
sanctioned statutes or regulations that sought to control or 
influence the manner in which States regulate private parties.   
For example, in Baker, the Supreme Court reviewed a 
challenge to the Internal Revenue Code’s enactment of § 
310(b)(1) of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 
1982, which prohibited States from issuing unregistered 
bearer bonds.  Notably, when reviewing the case, the Court 
specifically found that it did not need to address “the 
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possibility that the Tenth Amendment might set some limits 
on Congress’ power to compel States to regulate on behalf of 
federal interests” because the Court found that the 
commandeering concerns “in FERC [were] inapplicable to § 
310.”  Baker, 485 U.S. at 513.  Importantly, the Court 
distinguished § 310 from the statute in F.E.R.C. because the 
Court found that “Section 310 regulates state activities; it 
does not, as did the statute in FERC, seek to control or 
influence the manner in which States regulate private parties.”  
Id. at 514.  Similarly, in Reno, the Court addressed a statute 
that did not require (1) “the States in their sovereign capacity 
to regulate their own citizens,” (2) “the . . . Legislature to 
enact any laws or regulations,” or (3) “state officials to assist 
in the enforcement of federal statutes regulating private 
individuals.”  528 U.S. at 151.  It was only on these bases that 
the Supreme Court found the statute at issue in Reno was 
“consistent with the constitutional principles enunciated in 
New York and Printz.”  Id. 
 Unlike the statutes at issue in Baker and Reno, 
however, PASPA seeks to control and influence the manner 
in which States regulate private parties.  Through PASPA, 
Congress unambiguously commands that “[i]t shall be 
unlawful for . . . a governmental entity to . . . authorize by 
law” sports gambling.  28 U.S.C. § 3702.  By issuing this 
command, Congress has set an impermissible “mandatory 
agenda to be considered in all events by state legislative or 
administrative decisionmakers.”  F.E.R.C., 456 U.S. at 769. 
3. 
The logical extension of the majority is that PASPA 
prevents States from passing any laws to repeal existing 
gambling laws.  As the majority correctly notes, “[t]he word 
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‘authorize’ means, inter alia, ‘[t]o empower; to give a right or 
authority to act,’ or ‘[t]o permit a thing to be done in the 
future.’”  Maj. Op., at 17 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 
133 (6th Ed. 1990)) (footnote omitted).  Because 
authorization includes permitting a thing to be done, it 
follows that PASPA also prevents state officials from 
stopping enforcement of existing gambling laws.  States must 
regulate conduct prioritized by Congress.  Cf. Conant, 309 
F.3d at 646 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (“[P]reventing the state 
from repealing an existing law is no different from forcing it 
to pass a new one; in either case, the state is being forced to 
regulate conduct that it prefers to leave unregulated.”).   
It is true that civil actions to enjoin a violation of 
PASPA “may be commenced in an appropriate district court 
of the United States by the Attorney General of the United 
States.”  28 U.S.C. § 3703.  But it can hardly be said that the 
United States Attorney General bears the full regulatory 
burden because, through PASPA, Congress effectively 
commands the States to maintain and enforce existing 
gambling prohibitions.1 
PASPA is a statute that directs States to maintain 
gambling laws by dictating the manner in which States must 
enforce a federal law.  The Supreme Court has never 
considered Congress’ legislative power to be so expansive.  
See Prigg v. Com. of Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 541 (1842) 
(“It might well be deemed an unconstitutional exercise of the 
power of interpretation, to insist that the states are bound to 
                                              
1 A refusal to enforce existing laws would be the same 
as a repeal of existing laws: the States would be authorizing 
sports wagering.  
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provide means to carry into effect the duties of the national 
government, nowhere delegated or intrusted to them by the 
constitution”); F.E.R.C., 456 U.S. at 761–62  (“[T]his Court 
never has sanctioned explicitly a federal command to the 
States to promulgate and enforce laws and regulations ”) 
(citing E.P.A. v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977)); New York, 505 
U.S. at 178 (“Where a federal interest is sufficiently strong to 
cause Congress to legislate, it must do so directly; it may not 
conscript state governments as its agents.”); Nat’l Fed’n of 
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602 (2012) 
(plurality opinion) (“[T]he Constitution has never been 
understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the 
States to govern according to Congress’ instructions.” 
(quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 162)).   
II. 
It is now apparent that Christie I was incorrect in 
finding that “nothing in [PASPA’s] words requires that the 
states keep any law in place.”  730 F.3d at 232 (first and third 
emphasis added).  With respect to the doctrinal anchors of 
Christie I, the cornerstone of its holding has been eroded by 
the majority, which has excised Christie I’s discussion 
regarding “a false equivalence between repeal and an 
authorization.”  Id. at 233.  Notably, that discussion was 
included in Christie I to avoid “a series of constitutional 
problems.”  Id.  Today’s majority makes it clear that passing a 
law so that there is no law in place governing sports wagering 
is the same as authorizing it by law.  See Maj. Op., at 17 
(“The word ‘authorize’ means, inter alia, ‘[t]o empower; to 
give a right or authority to act,’ or ‘[t]o permit a thing to be 
done in the future.’”) (citation and footnote omitted).     
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I dissented in Christie I because the distinction 
between repeal and authorization is unworkable.  Today’s 
majority opinion validates my position: PASPA leaves the 
States with no choice.  While Christie I at least gave the 
States the option of repealing, in whole or in part, existing 
bans on gambling on sporting events, today’s decision tells 
the States that they must maintain an anti-sports wagering 
scheme.  The anti-commandeering doctrine, essential to 
protect State sovereignty, prohibits Congress from compelling 
States to prohibit such private activity.  Accordingly, I 
dissent. 
